11.6.06
Explaining nationalism...
A few rough thoughts on nationalism, inspired by a long stint proofreading documents at the U.N., a time marked by the end of the cold war. In this new paradigm, many ongoing wars (Angola, Mozambique) were now described as ‘tribal wars’, no longer as ‘proxy wars’. The official summations of the horrors unfolding in places like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda failed to grasp the complex causes — for example, the intersection of local, state and global venal interests on the frontiers (as Erich Hobsbawm points out) of former empires. Curious to find out more, I embarked on a period of graduate study during which I looked closely at Yugoslavia, Mauritania and the Sudan.
1. It is understood that human beings construct phenomena through patterns that are both set and fluctuating. These patterns are not random — once established, they begin to function on some level as myth. Repeated often enough they become “true”.
2. Somewhat tautologically, in traumatic divisive times in particular but at other times as well, humans will turn to symbols and literary (fictional or non-fictional) narratives as explanatory devices. The narratives establish pattern, placing explanation in the mode of genre. In other words, the experience of the new — the extraordinary — compels us to seek out and then reinvent (or re-interpret) old understandings. This latter process is reductive (as is possibly all genre). Thus most nationalist myths, while deeply resonant, are also somewhat flat — and heuristically paranoid. For example, while rape may have been unfortunately prevalent in Kosovo (and without ethnic bias), Milosevic is able to convert one instance into a universal principle, and thereby give just cause to his nationalist manifesto.
3. There is a great deal of chosen behavior as well that comes packaged in mythic deterministic form. Thus are venal ends made justifiable and censure avoided. On a more subtle level, human beings are very much engaged in the exploitation and manipulation of their material world and, in this regard, all the networks and associations that govern the distribution of resources and power. Weber refers to the emergence of “interest groups.” The more complex a society — or rather the more that outcomes are tied to a global economy — perhaps the more these factions are in evidence?
4. The mythic narratives (or “mythico history” per Liisa Maalki (or hystery per someone else)) employed are explanatory. In other words, the perceived rationales for certain events unfolding are to be found imbedded in the narratives. Not surprisingly, these narratives (and/or the meanings ascribed to them) are often deterministic and to a certain degree simplistic (or reductive). This is only to say they can be read more clearly than dreams. Also, they are not to be dismissed.
5. Civil war is apocalyptic. The rending of society is in most instances violent. The motivations however are complex, and far exceed simple readings that assign the blame due to a difference in blood or culture — an innate antipathy among peoples. Civil war implies the breakdown of civil society or the subtle skeins that once held different factions in cooperative meaningful relation. However, the rationale for the dismantling of a society is often necessarily simplistic. One must keep in mind the ways in which both local and international media are coopted. By fastening on the sorts of nationalist myths that drive many civil wars, the media in the end supports the idea (convenient for the perpetrators) that these wars are fueled by innate hatreds between different peoples. War then is portrayed as the result of animalistic irrational urges, not the calculations of those who seek to benefit.
6. Prior to such a fissure opening, it is averred that certain dynamics are often found operating. Or not. This is not meant to be a generalist stand. Rather in the period following the end of the cold war, a series of conflagrations erupted employing extraordinary levels of violence. In some, resolution has been eventually achieved — oftentimes violently, sometimes not. In other cases, the state as construct has been entirely eviscerated (witness Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia).
7.
1. It is understood that human beings construct phenomena through patterns that are both set and fluctuating. These patterns are not random — once established, they begin to function on some level as myth. Repeated often enough they become “true”.
2. Somewhat tautologically, in traumatic divisive times in particular but at other times as well, humans will turn to symbols and literary (fictional or non-fictional) narratives as explanatory devices. The narratives establish pattern, placing explanation in the mode of genre. In other words, the experience of the new — the extraordinary — compels us to seek out and then reinvent (or re-interpret) old understandings. This latter process is reductive (as is possibly all genre). Thus most nationalist myths, while deeply resonant, are also somewhat flat — and heuristically paranoid. For example, while rape may have been unfortunately prevalent in Kosovo (and without ethnic bias), Milosevic is able to convert one instance into a universal principle, and thereby give just cause to his nationalist manifesto.
3. There is a great deal of chosen behavior as well that comes packaged in mythic deterministic form. Thus are venal ends made justifiable and censure avoided. On a more subtle level, human beings are very much engaged in the exploitation and manipulation of their material world and, in this regard, all the networks and associations that govern the distribution of resources and power. Weber refers to the emergence of “interest groups.” The more complex a society — or rather the more that outcomes are tied to a global economy — perhaps the more these factions are in evidence?
4. The mythic narratives (or “mythico history” per Liisa Maalki (or hystery per someone else)) employed are explanatory. In other words, the perceived rationales for certain events unfolding are to be found imbedded in the narratives. Not surprisingly, these narratives (and/or the meanings ascribed to them) are often deterministic and to a certain degree simplistic (or reductive). This is only to say they can be read more clearly than dreams. Also, they are not to be dismissed.
5. Civil war is apocalyptic. The rending of society is in most instances violent. The motivations however are complex, and far exceed simple readings that assign the blame due to a difference in blood or culture — an innate antipathy among peoples. Civil war implies the breakdown of civil society or the subtle skeins that once held different factions in cooperative meaningful relation. However, the rationale for the dismantling of a society is often necessarily simplistic. One must keep in mind the ways in which both local and international media are coopted. By fastening on the sorts of nationalist myths that drive many civil wars, the media in the end supports the idea (convenient for the perpetrators) that these wars are fueled by innate hatreds between different peoples. War then is portrayed as the result of animalistic irrational urges, not the calculations of those who seek to benefit.
6. Prior to such a fissure opening, it is averred that certain dynamics are often found operating. Or not. This is not meant to be a generalist stand. Rather in the period following the end of the cold war, a series of conflagrations erupted employing extraordinary levels of violence. In some, resolution has been eventually achieved — oftentimes violently, sometimes not. In other cases, the state as construct has been entirely eviscerated (witness Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia).
7.
